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THE PERSPECTIVAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
Blake McAllister 
Whether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what 
degree, depends on how things seem to the subject—i.e., on one’s perspective. 
I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase 
support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the 
common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically 
wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism 
and our observations of evil. The third is by lowering the initial plausibility of 
theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil” and argue that skeptical 
theism does not fully address it.
Eleonore Stump offers us the following premise:
Imagine an intelligent being Max from a far-distant world in which all sen-
tient beings live only in one very large edifice, outside of which there is 
nothing at all. None of these beings is ever seriously sick, and none of them 
ever dies. And now suppose that Max, who has seen nothing else of earth 
life, is somehow enabled to see a video of events inside a large city hospital 
on earth, where the Chief of Staff is a surgeon.1
Stump goes on to describe how differently Max will judge the Chief of Staff 
than those of us who know and understand sickness, death, medicine, and 
their places in the larger world. What Max believes to be sadistic torture, 
we desire for the sake of healing. While Max scoffs at the idea of life out-
side of the hospital, we orient our entire stay around it. Suffering that Max 
believes to be gratuitous we consent to in faith and hope. The story illus-
trates how one’s beliefs about God and evil depends to a great extent on 
which belief-system, or worldview, is operating in the background.
I want to draw attention to the role that experience, broadly construed, 
plays in the interpretive process. Max not only believes the suffering of the 
patients to be incompatible with a loving Chief of Staff, he perceives the sit-
uation that way. Procedures which prod and poke seem cruel and heinous 
to Max in a way that they do not to us. Life outside the hospital seems 
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1Stump, “Reply to Draper,” 204. See also Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 17–18.
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almost comically implausible. The pain he witnesses appears pointless. 
How things seem (his perspective) and what Max believes (his world-
view) are interrelated, each influencing the other in turn. The implication 
is that one’s conclusions about God and evil depend not only on one’s 
worldview but on one’s perspective as well.
Part of what makes the problem of evil so intractable is that encoun-
tering evil, both suffering it and observing the suffering of others, has the 
potential to enact precisely the sort of change in perspective that results 
in an interpretive framework on which suffering constitutes serious evi-
dence against the existence of a loving God—or at least in which the over-
all plausibility of God’s existence is otherwise significantly diminished. 
This is a largely unacknowledged means by which experiences of evil can 
generate rational support for atheism.2 Even if it is not evil per se that 
engenders the atheistic perspective, the vital point is that the onset of such 
a perspective leads to increased support for atheism via considerations of 
evil. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil.”
I begin by charting out how encounters with evil can shift one’s perspec-
tive (Section I) and how this can result in increased support for atheism 
(Section II). This mapping is not only worthwhile in itself, but also holds 
crucial insights into how one must respond in order to defeat such sup-
port. In particular, I will be at pains to show that skeptical theism does not 
completely cut off the support for atheism generated by the perspectival 
problem of evil—for some, perhaps, but not for everyone. Thus, skeptical 
theism may be part of the theist’s response, but it cannot be the whole of it. 
To be clear, this is not an objection to skeptical theism so much as to the pre-
tense that it provides a final and decisive blow to the problem of evil. I hint 
(in Section III) at what a more complete theistic response needs to look like, 
and conclude (in Section IV) with how the perspectival nature of rational-
ity should affect our approach to the problem of evil more generally.
1. Perspective Shifts
In this section, I will introduce three important ways in which evil can 
alter one’s perspective. Before doing so, however, I  need to clarify the 
notion of a perspective.
A perspective is a formative and lasting disposition for things to seem a 
certain way. There is a specific kind of experience or mental state at issue here 
called “seemings” or “appearances.” Seemings are  representational mental 
states with propositional content. What sets them apart is their phenome-
nal character, which makes their content feel as though it is true or false.3 
2The recent exception is Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 
which is discussed below. See also Gellman, “Religious Experience,” for an application of 
this approach to religious experience.
3Some argue that seemings are beliefs or inclinations to believe rather than experiences of 
the sort I describe here. See McAllister, “Seemings and Sui Generis,” for an overview of the 
debate and a defense of the experience view.
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Seemings come in many varieties: perceptual, memorial, introspective, intel-
lectual (commonly called “intuitions”), and possibly more. For instance, 
when one intuits that everything is identical to itself, the subject has an intel-
lectual seeming with the propositional content 〈∀x (x = x)〉. Furthermore, it 
presents that content to the subject in a way that makes it feel true or rep-
resentative of the way things really are. Other kinds of seemings have the 
same structure as intellectual seemings but are accompanied and occasioned 
by other distinctive kinds of mental states. Perceptual seemings, for exam-
ple, are prompted by sensations (broadly understood as the sort of mental 
states involving sensory phenomenology such as sights, sounds, smells, 
tastes, and tactile feels).4 Thus, the broader perceptual process has a kind 
of two-step structure: first come perceptual sensations, which then give rise 
to perceptual seemings.5 More often than not, these perceptual seemings 
will be about the states of affairs that are (non-conceptually) represented in 
one’s sensations.6 Thus, I might receive various perceptual sensations as of 
a black dog running towards me, which then occasion in me the perceptual 
seeming that my dog is running over to greet me. Importantly, a stranger 
may have the same  sensations as I do and yet, given the differences in our 
background  information and cognitive habituation, experience a different 
perceptual seeming. It may seem to him that a non-descript black dog is 
running towards him, or (if he is skittish) that a vicious black dog is coming 
to attack him. This last example illustrates just how differently the world 
can seem to different people, even if they are both interacting with the same 
concrete state of affairs.
One’s seemings can be systematically oriented in a certain way, dispos-
ing one to see the world in light of a particular interpretive framework. 
Most relevant to us, individuals can come to possess theistic or atheistic 
perspectives on the world. Generally speaking, things will seem to be as 
4Some, like Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, argue that perceptual seemings 
should be identified with sensations (perhaps of a special sort). I side with Tucker, “Why 
Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism,” in thinking that seemings should be 
kept distinct from sensations, though they are closely related in that sensations give rise 
to perceptual seemings and perceptual seemings may make reference to things presented 
non-conceptually in sensations. The broader aims of this paper do not, however, depend on 
the distinction between seemings and sensations.
5The relationship between a perceptual seeming and a perceptual experience will be left 
open. One could maintain that the perceptual seeming comes after the perceptual experi-
ence, or that it just is the perceptual experience, or that it is one component of the percep-
tual experience along with perceptual sensations. This last theory is called “dual-component 
theory” in Smith, The Problem of Perception. It is most commonly associated with Thomas 
Reid. See Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind. See Bengson, Grube, and Korman, “A New 
Framework for Conceptualism,” for a contemporary version of dual-component theory that 
I find more convincing than Reid’s.
6Instead of characterizing those states with sensory phenomenology as non-conceptual 
representations (e.g., Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness), one might think of them as relational 
states in which objects are directly presented to one’s awareness (e.g., Campbell, Reference 
and Consciousness).
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they would be were God (not) to exist.7 For instance, someone with an 
atheistic perspective might be disposed to have a constellation of seem-
ings and intuitions that align with naturalism: it seems to them that there 
are no gods, that naturalism is a simpler hypothesis than bare theism, that 
observed phenomena (even consciousness) can be adequately explained 
without introducing anything immaterial, that the existence of anything at 
all is just a brute fact, that there is no great purpose or meaning to reality, 
that there are no objective moral values or duties, and, of special note, that 
a loving God would be unlikely or unable to allow the kinds of evils we 
observe. This describes an especially thorough-going atheistic perspec-
tive, but it is entirely possible and common for people to have an atheistic 
perspective with respect to some areas but not others.
My contention is that encountering evil can shift one into an atheistic 
perspective, pervasively or with respect to a particular area. I  take this 
to be a fairly uncontroversial empirical claim—one that most of us have 
witnessed in ourselves or others and that is consonant with our general 
understanding of how the human mind functions. That being said, we 
would do well to see if psychology can offer us anything to confirm or 
disconfirm our hypothesis.
To begin, many psychological studies have observed a correlation 
between negative life events and the loss or lessening importance of reli-
gious belief.8 Add to this that suffering personal misfortune and hearing 
about the suffering of others are two of the most common reasons put 
forwards by apostates to explain their loss of belief.9 This is not to say 
that most people change their religious beliefs in response to negative life 
events (most don’t), or even that the dampening of religious beliefs is the 
most common alteration undergone. Indeed, as many or more people see 
an increase in religiosity as a result of negative life events—a phenomenon 
7Interestingly, De Cruz (“Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological 
Concepts”) and De Cruz and De Smedt (“How Do Philosophers Evaluate Natural Theological 
Arguments?”) find “a robust correlation between perceived strength of natural theological 
arguments and religious belief” (De Cruz and De Smedt, “How Do Philosophers Evaluate 
Natural Theological Arguments?”, 139). The proclivity to fall into theistic or atheistic per-
spectives on the world would aptly explain these findings.
8E.g., Aten et al., “Predictors of God Concept and God Control After Hurricane Katrina”; 
Ben-Ezra et al., “Losing my Religion”; Bierman, “The Effects of Childhood Maltreatment on 
Adult Religiosity and Spirituality”; Falsetti, Resick, and Davis, “Changes in Religious Beliefs 
Following Trauma”; Fontana and Rosenheck, “Trauma, Change in Strength of Religious 
Faith, and Mental Health Service Use Among Veterans Treated for PTSD”; Gall et  al., “A 
Longitudinal Study on the Role of Spirituality in Response to the Diagnosis and Treatment of 
Breast Cancer”; Krause and Hayward, “Humility, Lifetime Trauma, and Change in Religious 
Doubt Among Older Adults”; Seirmarco et  al., “Religiosity and Mental Health”; Walker 
et al., “Changes in Personal Religion/Spirituality During and After Childhood Abuse.”
9Zuckerman, Galen, and Pasquale, The Nonreligious. This is not to say that such reasons 
are predominant. The most common factor cited in this study was a kind of “acquired incre-
dulity” (ibid, 96) in which their religious belief simply stopped seeming true. (Although it 
would not surprise me if the onset of this acquired incredulity sometimes had to do with 
seeing or suffering evil).
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illuminated by the work of Kenneth Pargament and others on how reli-
gious beliefs are used to cope with or make sense of suffering.10 This is not 
inconsistent, of course, with my initial observation that negative events 
also have a significant potential to result in the loss of religious belief. The 
fact is that negative events are polarizing—they have a much greater ten-
dency than most other kinds of events to send people in one direction or 
the other, to bolster religious beliefs or dismantle them.
Psychologists are still developing an understanding of precisely how 
suffering leads to the loss of religious belief. Unsurprisingly, the causes are 
manifold and complex. For instance, while intellectual theorizing surely 
plays some role,11 there is also evidence that negative emotions, such as 
being angry with God or perceiving him as cruel or distant, can be an 
important factor in this process. Studies show that undergoing suffering 
can lead to negative feelings towards God12 and that such feelings are 
often a significant factor in non-belief.13 My only sticking point here is a 
moderate one: that the story of how suffering leads to non-belief is gen-
erally more complex than people observing suffering, reasoning through 
the philosophical problem of evil, and changing their beliefs accordingly.
What role do appearances play in this more complex story? A recent 
study sought to isolate this very thing.14 The study tracked the God images 
(how one experiences God) and God concepts (what one believes about God) 
of undergraduate students at six months and twelve months after under-
going religious or spiritual struggles (RS struggles) such as those caused 
by suffering. Researchers found that by six months students perceived God 
more negatively, but held largely the same religious beliefs. By twelve 
months, however, those who perceived God negatively also believed more 
negatively. Thus, RS struggles “predict less benevolent experiences with 
God six months later, which, in turn, predict less benevolent theological 
doctrine of God six months after that.”15 Interestingly, researchers found 
that RS struggles were “not directly associated with people’s theologi-
cal/doctrinal understanding of God across the time points,” but were 
indirectly associated with less benevolent God concepts via less benevo-
lent God images.16 This indicates is that, “the changes to one’s theology 
10Pargament, The Psychology of Religion and Coping.
11Apostates generally identify intellectual reasons as the most important (though not the 
exclusive) factor in their loss of belief (e.g., Bradley et  al., “The Reasons of Atheists and 
Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Existence Scale”).
12E.g., Exline et al., “Anger Toward God.”
13E.g., Bradley, Exline, Uzdavines, “Relational Reasons for Nonbelief in the Existence of 
Gods.” Interestingly, Bradley et al., “The Reasons of Atheists and Agnostics for Nonbelief in 
God’s Existence Scale,” found that negative relational reasons for non-belief (such as being 
angry at God) correlated more highly with citing the problem of evil as a cause of non-belief 
than did intellectual reasons.
14Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations.”
15Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 230.
16Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 228.
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happen over time and are a result of how one experiences God differently 
as a result of RS struggles.”17
While the psychological literature in this area is nascent,18 it should 
come as no surprise to anyone human or familiar with humans that suf-
fering can alter how things seem to the person. Forgive me, then, for going 
beyond the literature and identifying three specific ways in which suffer-
ing can alter one’s perspective. Obviously, these claims are open to (dis)
confirmation as further data rolls in.
The first tendency of note is evil’s ability to change the way one feels 
about evil itself. In particular, witnessing some evil can incite the kinds of 
experiences emphasized by Trent Dougherty and Jerome Gellman in which 
it seems to the subject that an instance, kind, or pattern of evil is morally 
impermissible for God to allow.19 There are two kinds of “impermissibil-
ity appearances” corresponding to the two ways in which an allowance 
might be impermissible. First, it can seem that evil is gratuitous.20 Such 
an intuition tacitly concedes that allowing such evil might be permissible 
if there was some greater good or worse evil suitably connected to it, but 
insists that such things are absent.21 These “gratuitous evil appearances,” 
as we might call them, have received increasing attention in the literature. 
17Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 231.
18Van Tongeren et al., write, “This study is the first, to our knowledge, to contribute to 
our understanding of how these RS struggles predict the way people experientially relate 
to and doctrinally view God over time” (“Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God 
Representations,” 231).
19See Dougherty, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,” and 
“The Common Sense Problem of Evil,” and Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil,” 
and “A Surviving Version of the Common Sense Problem of Evil.” In the lattermost, Gellman 
seems to misinterpret Dougherty on how evil is experienced. Gellman interprets Dougherty 
as saying that the subject experiences a poignant evil and then quickly infers that this evil is 
gratuitous. As an alternative, Gellman suggests that subjects (at least sometimes) experience 
evil as gratuitous. The gratuitousness of the evil is embedded in the content of the experience 
itself rather than coming downstream from the experience via inference. Dougherty’s claim, 
however, has always been the same as Gellman’s. On Dougherty’s account, the subject has a 
seeming with the propositional content 〈this evil is gratuitous〉. Thus, the gratuitousness of 
the evil is a part of the representational content of the experiential state.
20Note that the truth conditions of “it appears to S that p” is just S’s possession of a seem-
ing with the propositional content p. This is different from how Wykstra uses that phrase in 
his CORNEA principle: “On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 
‘It appears that p’ only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties 
and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is 
in some way discernible by her” (Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments 
from Suffering,” 85). It should be of little controversy that evil can seem gratuitous in the 
former sense (and that one is entitled to claim this), even if there is a second sense of that 
phrase for which Wykstra’s principle holds true.
21Some people question whether it can appear to you that something is absent (e.g., 
whether it can appear to you that there is no elephant in the room). Maybe it can only appear 
to you that something is present, from which you must infer an absence (e.g., it appears to 
you that there is a room with tables and chairs in it, but it does not appear to do you that 
there is elephant, thus you infer that there is no elephant in the room). On the account of 
seemings given above, this worry is clearly misguided. There is no reason why a seeming 
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Tragically less attention has been given to the appearance that some evil 
is intrinsically wrong for God to allow. For instance, upon encountering 
someone who has been allowed to suffer “consciousness-shattering hor-
ror without a clue as to why,” it may seem that this is something that 
is never moral to permit.22 Just as killing an innocent human may seem 
wrong, damn the consequences, so allowing certain kinds of suffering 
may seem inherently wrong no matter what greater good may come of it. 
Suffering oneself, or observing it in others, can increase the intensity or 
frequency of these impermissibility appearances.
Encountering evil can also affect how well theism seems to fit with the 
patterns of evil and suffering that we observe. For example, take Richard 
Swinburne’s claim that God’s preventing cancer would have deprived 
us of the opportunity to freely perform the great good actions needed to 
strive against it and perhaps one day eliminate cancer.23 This may seem 
to someone to be a great good indeed, one worth allowing diseases like 
cancer to secure . . . until that person’s loved one is diagnosed. What once 
seemed “worth it” now seems far too high a cost.
The reach of evil extends even farther than this, however. Encountering 
evil can bring about the kind of pervasive atheistic perspective described 
above, and the onset of this perspective will often result in the adoption of 
a matching system of beliefs—a phenomenon Gellman calls “noetic recon-
struction,” i.e., “a new, extensive, systematic, modification of a person’s 
noetic content.”24 Regarding the power of evil to trigger noetic reconstruc-
tion, Gellman writes,
[Noetic reconstruction] can be from a sudden switch, to “seeing” things in 
a radical new way, or result from the appearance of deep noetic discontent 
.  .  .  . An atheistic conversion experience can be the cause of noetic recon-
struction by giving rise all at once to a radical ingression into one’s noetic 
framework so that one sees life and reality in a wholly new way. Alternately, 
it can cause radical disruption of one’s noetic framework, issuing into noetic 
discontent that then issues in noetic repair along atheistic lines.25
The crucial point for us is that experiencing evil can incite a radical new 
way of seeing things, an atheistic perspective, that results in the adoption 
of an atheistic worldview.26
might not have the propositional content 〈x is absent〉 or 〈there is no x here〉 or anything at 
all, for that matter. Even with respect to perceptual seemings, there is no reason why percep-
tual sensations might not trigger a perceptual seeming with the proposition content 〈there 
is no elephant in this room〉. The debate about whether there can be appearances of absence 
are, in my estimation, only of concern for those who identify seemings and sensations. For 
it is a controversial question whether absences can be represented in perceptual sensations.
22Dougherty, “The Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
23Swinburne, Is There a God?, Ch. 6.
24Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107.
25Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107.
26Gellman outlines several causal pathways that evil might take in revising one’s world-
view (“The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107–108), but that level of detail is 
unnecessary for our current purposes.
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Finally, note that this general sort of perspective shift can be brought on 
by other kinds of experience besides that of evil. For instance, becoming 
the mentee of a brilliant and charismatic naturalist (if only through books) 
might, through one’s interactions, result in the shift towards an atheis-
tic perspective. Thus, the conclusions I  draw about the epistemological 
effects of such shifts, will apply equally well to situations in which some-
thing other than evil serves as the trigger.
2. The Perspectival Problem of Evil
Return now to the problem of evil. There are of course many formulations 
of the problem,27 each of which calls for a different sort of treatment. Our 
reasoning must nonetheless proceed through certain recognizable stages. 
We begin with the evidence that purportedly poses a problem for theism. 
Let us call it “the evidence of evil.” We then make an assessment of how 
well the evidence of evil fits with theism.28 We then take into account all 
of our other evidence, including the intrinsic plausibility of theism, before 
reaching our final position. In this section, I will show how encountering 
evil can affect each of these stages in ways that pose a threat to theism. It is 
this tendency for evil (and other life experiences) to produce a perspective 
on which observed evils constitute serious evidence against God’s exist-
ence that gives rise to the perspectival problem of evil.
The discussion will proceed from an internalist point of view: roughly, 
the factors considered relevant for justification or rationality will be limited 
to those the subject is aware of within his or her first-person point of view. 
Ideally, we could discuss both internalist and externalist approaches to these 
issues, but doing so simply isn’t feasible given the space available. By way of 
terminology, I will often talk about the rational support that evil provides for 
atheism. As I use the term here, S has justification for believing p if and only 
if S has sufficient rational support for p. Gaining rational support for p does 
not guarantee justification, but it does tend towards it: if the total balance of 
rational support tips enough in favor of p, then believing p is justified.
2.1. Impermissibility Appearances
The evidence of evil will be different for each person if only for the mun-
dane reason that no two people know about exactly the same evils. But 
27E.g., Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”; Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties 
of Atheism”; Draper, “Pain and Pleasure.”
28In Mackie’s logical problem of evil, the evidence of evil consists in the existence of any 
evil whatsoever, and we must assess whether that evidence is logically compatible with the-
ism. (Mackie says they’re not). In Rowe’s evidential problem of evil, the evidence of evil 
consists in our observations of evil, and we must assess whether these observations are likely 
to be compatible with theism (Rowe says observed evils are probably gratuitous and, accord-
ingly, probably incompatible with theism). In Draper’s probabilistic problem of evil, the evi-
dence of evil consists in observed patterns of pleasure and pain, and we must assess whether 
these patterns are more likely given theism or the hypothesis of indifference (Draper says 
they are more likely given the latter).
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even if we had observed all and only the same evils, our evidence would 
still not be the same. This is because different people can construe the same 
state of affairs in different ways. What seems this way to one will seem 
that way to another. Thus, when it comes to the problem of evil, not only 
do people assess the evidence differently, they are assessing different evi-
dence! The onset of an atheistic perspective can affect how one experiences 
evil, thereby altering the evidence of evil that one sets out to evaluate.
An important instance of this general effect is that the shift towards an 
atheistic perspective can intensify impermissibility appearances.29 Some 
think these appearances provide immediate rational support for believing 
that the observed evils are impermissible.30 Obviously, if the existence of 
morally unallowable evils is admitted into the evidence of evil, then this 
would provide rational support for atheism.
The controversial point here is whether impermissibility appearances 
really do provide one with rational support for their content. Dougherty 
points out that, given a principle like phenomenal conservatism (often 
called a “common sense epistemic principle” in light of its association 
with the common sense epistemological tradition of Chisholm, Moore, 
and Reid), such appearances provide prima facie justification for believing 
that the observed evils are impermissible.31
Phenomenal conservatism (PC) If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of 
defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing 
that p.32
Gellman argues that the same is true given Swinburne’s principle of cre-
dulity (a principle closely related to PC and the common sense episte-
mological tradition).33 Dougherty calls the power of impermissibility 
29This is not the only way in which one’s perspective can significantly affect the evidence 
of evil. For instance, the same evil may appear more heinous or cruel or random from one 
perspective than from another, adding content to the evidence of evil that is harder to square 
with the existence of a loving God.
30If the relevant seeming is a gratuitous evil appearance, then things may be slightly 
trickier. This is because, granting van Inwagen’s point in The Problem of Evil that some gra-
tuitous evils are unavoidable, the gratuitousness of an evil does not entail its impermissibil-
ity. Nevertheless, the gratuitousness of an evil will still greatly lower the probability of its 
permissibility. Furthermore, the existence of certain kinds or magnitudes or frequencies of 
gratuitous evil will still be morally non-allowable, even granting van Inwagen’s point, and 
gratuitous evil appearances can provide rational support for believing that those specific 
conditions obtain.
31Dougherty, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism.”
32Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” 30. A more moderate version of 
phenomenal conservatism that only guarantees some level of rational support for the con-
tent of seemings (but perhaps not a level of rational support sufficient for justification) would 
still pose a problem for the theist.
33See Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 100–102. Swinburne, 
The Existence of God, contains his principle of credulity. Swinburne addresses phenome-
nal conservatism and religious experience in “Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious 
Experience.”
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appearances to provide immediate and non-inferential rational support 
for the existence of evils incompatible with God “the common sense prob-
lem of evil.” Thus, a key element of the perspectival problem of evil is an 
intensification of the common sense problem of evil, as the shift towards 
an atheistic perspective can make impermissibility appearances stronger, 
more frequent, and more resilient.
Earlier I identified two kinds of impermissibility appearances: appear-
ances of gratuitousness and appearances of intrinsic wrongness. Their dif-
ferences are relevant for the following discussion, and so I will treat them 
in sequence, beginning with the former.
Given PC, gratuitous evil appearances are clearly a potential source of 
support for atheism. There have been two main responses to this, both 
from skeptical theists. Skeptical theists are theists who endorse something 
like the following principle and take that endorsement to undermine the 
rationality of believing in the existence of gratuitous evils (particularly via 
a noseeum inference):
ST – Humans are in no position to judge directly that an omnipotent and 
omniscient being would be unlikely to have a morally sufficient reason to 
permit the evils we find in the world.34
Skeptical theists support ST in many ways, including by appeal to the 
following sorts of skeptical theses:
ST1 – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know 
of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2 – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know 
of are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3 – We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we 
know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are 
representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods 
and the permission of possible evils.35
Reflection, the skeptical theist maintains, shows such theses to be exceed-
ingly plausible. These, in turn, support ST.
The first skeptical theist response is to concede that gratuitous evil 
appearances initially provide rational support for the existence of point-
less evils, but argue that learning ST defeats this initial support.36 The sec-
ond is to deny PC, arguing that, in light of ST, gratuitous evil appearances 
do not provide even initial rational support for believing their content.37 
I will have something to say about both of these responses, starting with 
the former.
34Draper, “The Skeptical Theist,” 176.
35Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12.
36Matheson, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism”; Rutledge, 
“Perspectival Skeptical Theism.”
37Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism”; Senor, “Skeptical Theism, CORNEA, and 
Common Sense Epistemology”;  Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
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Matheson argues that if one comes to believe in ST, even with mod-
est confidence, then one will have an undercutting defeater sufficient to 
remove all of the rational support provided by gratuitous evil appear-
ances. To see why, note that having a gratuitous evil appearance is akin to 
“a person, upon seeing Mount Everest, claiming that it seems that Mount 
Everest is the tallest mountain in the universe.”38 A moments reflection 
should convince the subject that this appearance ought not be trusted—
one isn’t in a position to compare the height of Mount Everest, towering 
though it may be, to all of the other mountains in the universe. ST gives us 
similar reasons for doubting the appearance that nothing could justify an 
observed evil.39 Thus, Matheson is correct that learning ST will diminish 
the support provided by gratuitous evil appearances; however, it may not 
always eliminate it entirely.40 In essence, even if we think ST x likely, that 
still leaves 1-x chance that we are in a position to judge such matters and, 
thus, that our appearances can be trusted. The lower x is, the greater the 
potential that one still possesses some degree of increased rational sup-
port for believing the content of his or her gratuitous evil appearances.
To illustrate the point, consider a situation in which you are asked to 
search the room for a certain kind of bug called “maybe-see-ums.” You 
search the room thoroughly, and it seems to you that there are no maybe-
see-ums. You thereby gain some rational support for believing that there 
aren’t any maybe-see-ums in the room. You then find an info sheet listing 
facts about maybe-see-ums, including that they cannot be seen with the 
naked eye. Does this counter the rational support provided by your seem-
ing? It depends on how much you trust the info sheet. If you see that it’s 
published by an expert entomologist, then all (or almost all) of the rational 
support provided by that seeming will be effectively countered. If you see 
that it’s an elementary school project written in crayon perhaps it only 
partially counters the rational support provided by your seeming—after 
all, maybe the report is wrong and you would be able to see the maybe-
see-ums if they were there. The point is that the defeat of one’s rational 
support is not an all or nothing matter. The same is true with respect to 
gratuitous evil appearances and skeptical theism. If we are only some-
what skeptical of our abilities to judge whether God has reasons for allow-
ing evil (the lower the probability of ST), then some of the initial rational 
support provided by our gratuitous evil appearances can still get through.
Regarding the probability of ST, one possibility worth considering is 
whether gratuitous evil appearances in and of themselves can give one 
reason to doubt ST. Consider a potential Moorean response to external 
world skepticism. It seems to the subject that there is an external world. 
The external world skeptic seeks to undermine any justification this 
38Hendricks, “How to Be a Skeptical Theist and a Commonsense Epistemologist,” 350.
39See the scathing and powerful critique of gratuitous evil appearances (and those who 
champion them) in Hudson, A Grotesque in the Garden, 122–124.
40Dougherty, “Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,” 
336–339.
432 Faith and Philosophy
external world seeming might provide by putting forward something 
analogous to ST:
Ex-ST – Humans are in no position to judge directly that an evil deceiver is 
unlikely to be manipulating them into falsely believing in an external world.
The Moorean responds, “Well, I  obviously know that there’s an external 
world, so I know I am not being deceived. Hence, I must be in a position to 
judge that an evil deceiver is unlikely to be manipulating me. Thus, Ex-ST is 
false.” Bergmann makes this sort of move with respect to God’s reasons in 
response to Wilks.41 Bergmann claims we can know immediately, as a mat-
ter of common sense, that we have hands, and from that we can infer that 
God does not have a sufficient all–things–considered reason for deceiving us 
about this. It follows that we must be in a position to directly judge God’s 
reasons in this instance at least. If this Moorean response is effective, then it’s 
not immediately apparent why someone couldn’t do the same with a strong 
enough appearance of gratuitous evil, saying to oneself, “I obviously know 
that this evil is gratuitous, so I know that there is no morally justifying rea-
son to allow it. Hence, I must be in a position to judge that God is unlikely 
to have a morally sufficient reason for permitting this evil. Thus, ST is false.” 
From the inside, this reasoning mirrors Bergmann’s reasoning exactly. Such 
a Moorean strategy may be flawed, but at the very least it puts pressure on 
those skeptical theists who favor a Moorean response to skepticism.
If one does not favor the Moorean response, then how is one to defend 
against external world skepticism and Ex-ST? A  predominant response 
is that, in building a case for Ex-ST, the skeptic manages to establish only 
the possibility that we are being deceived—that we cannot absolutely rule 
out the possibility of deception. The skeptic does not show that there is 
any plausibility that we are wrong. And the mere possibility of error is 
insufficient to establish that we are in no position to judge the matter at 
hand. There is a principle here—that the plausibility of error is required 
to undermine our confidence in our ability to discern something—which 
we can call “the plausibility requirement.” One might object to skeptical 
theism along the same lines. One could concede that the skeptical the-
ists’ arguments for ST show that possibly there are reasons beyond our 
ken which could morally justify God’s allowing observed evils. But it is 
much less clear that these arguments establish that plausibly there are rea-
sons which could morally justify God’s allowing observed evils. In other 
words, it is not evident that the plausibility requirement has been met.
This is especially true of those who accept the condition, endorsed by 
Stump and many others, that morally justifying goods must accrue primar-
ily to the sufferer.42 For then, whatever other cosmic goods beyond our ken 
41Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 27 and Wilks, “Skeptical Theism and 
Empirical Unfalsifiability.”
42Stump, Wandering in Darkness. See also the position of Adams, Horrendous Evils and the 
Goodness of God, that for God to count as loving towards someone, it must be the case that he 
defeats their suffering, where defeat requires at minimum ensuring that one’s life is on the 
whole worth living.
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may be made available by human suffering, God must also use that suffer-
ing to bring about goods for the human victims—a domain with which we 
are much more familiar. To see why this is important, notice that one can 
endorse ST1-ST3 above without being committed ST1*-ST3*:
ST1* – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods for 
humans we know of are representative of the possible goods for humans 
there are.
ST2* – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils for humans 
we know of are representative of the possible evils for humans there are.
ST3* – We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations 
we know of between possible goods for humans and the permission of pos-
sible evils for humans are representative of the entailment relations there are 
between possible goods for humans and the permission of possible evils for 
humans.
Limiting our focus to human goods can give one increased confidence in 
his or her grasp of the relevant domain and, in turn, increased assurance 
in his or her ability to make judgments concerning the gratuitousness of 
suffering, thus lowering confidence in ST.43
To sum up, in order to justify ST, the skeptical theist needs to establish 
the plausibility of error in assessing the gratuitousness of evil, not just its 
possibility. But there is reasonable disagreement about whether the skep-
tical theist has met this burden. There are many more arguments for and 
against ST that would need to be considered in assessing its overall likeli-
hood, and this is not the forum to survey those arguments. Suffice it to say 
that ST is not rationally uncontestable, and there may even be those for 
whom the probability of ST is not particularly high. This leaves the door 
open for gratuitous evil appearances to continue to provide some level of 
rational support for the existence of gratuitous evils.
The second way of responding to gratuitous evil appearances promises 
to prevent gratuitous evil appearances from providing any rational sup-
port at all. This strategy maintains that gratuitous evil appearances do not 
provide even initial rational support for believing in the existence of gra-
tuitous evils. This requires one to deny PC, at least with respect to gratui-
tous evil appearances. Denying PC is a cost as there are, in my judgment, 
good reasons for endorsing PC.44 Nevertheless, even if we drop PC, it does 
43Bergmann, in “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” in 
a response to similar observations made in Rowe’s “The Empirical Argument from Evil,” 
claims he finds ST1* (and, we can extrapolate, ST2* and ST3*) plausible for the same kinds 
of reasons he endorses ST1-3. Of course, it’s not clear that all rational people must agree 
with Bergmann here. At the very least, one might reasonably find ST1*–3* significantly less 
plausible than one finds ST1–3, thereby creating greater opportunity for partially undefeated 
gratuitous evil appearances.
44See, e.g., Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and “Phenomenal Conservatism 
and the Internalist Intuition”; Tucker, “Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse 
Dogmatism”; and McAllister, “Restoring Common Sense.”
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not immediately follow that gratuitous evil appearances fail to provide 
rational support for believing in the existence of gratuitous evils. Indeed, 
it is relatively uncontroversial among non-skeptical folk that, in general, 
learning that something seems to be the case will give one some rational 
support for believing that it is the case.45 (This better be true! Try doing 
philosophy, or engaging in any rational discipline for that matter, without 
relying on the way things appear). So, we need some reason to think that 
appearances of gratuitous evil are an exception to the general rule.
Michael Bergmann provides one possible reason. Bergmann insists that 
we cannot “just see directly,” as a matter of common sense, that some evil 
is gratuitous (or even probably so).46 Now, it is perfectly clear that one can 
“see directly” that some evil is gratuitous in the sense that one can have 
a seeming with this content—a fact Bergmann surely would not deny. 
What Bergmann does deny is that these seemings provide rational sup-
port for their content such that one can justifiably base a basic belief on 
them. But why? Bergmann is happy to concede that other seemings, such 
as the appearance that I have hands, can rationally support basic beliefs 
in their content. Given Bergmann’s proper functionalism and Reidian 
commonsensism,47 the answer is likely that the only seemings which can 
rationally support basic beliefs are ones produced by the proper func-
tioning of our reliably truth-aimed faculties operating in an appropriate 
environment,48 and gratuitous evil appearances don’t meet those criteria. 
This proposal is not acceptable to the internalist, since it appeals to fac-
tors of which the subject might not be aware—namely, the casual origins 
of the seeming. Of course, if the subject learns that his or her gratuitous 
evil appearances are not produced by properly functioning faculties, then 
this would provide an undermining defeater for the rational support pro-
vided by that appearance. But the causal origins of the seeming cannot 
be used to block initial rational support from occurring in the first place. 
If one does opt for the defeater route, we must circle back around to the 
conclusions of our previous discussion: namely, that the defeat of this 
initial support may only be partial depending on how probable ST is on 
the subject’s evidence.
Chris Tweedt offers a more internalist-friendly reason to think that gra-
tuitous evil appearances do not provide any rational support for believing 
45Explanationists, for instance, can maintain that, in ordinary evidential situations, the 
best explanation of the fact that it seems to you that p includes the truth of p.  (There is, 
however, an important difference between how seemings provide evidence on PC and how 
they do so on explanationism. For PC, seemings themselves immediately move one into a 
position in which it is rational to believe their content, absent defeaters. On explanationism, 
updating on the proposition 〈it seems that p〉 provides inferential support for p). For an 
externalist approach to seemings, see Bergmann, “Externalist Justification and the Role of 
Seemings.”
46Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 19.
47See Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness and “Reidian Externalism,” respectively.
48See Bergmann, “Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings,” section 2.2.
435THE PERSPECTIVAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
their content. Tweedt proposes a modified version of Stephen Wykstra’s 
CORNEA principle:
Reformulated CORNEA – Evidence E that is new to S (incrementally) sup-
ports hypothesis H only if it is the case that if H were false, E would more 
likely be different.49
The necessary condition on confirmation should be understood in terms 
of conditional epistemic probabilities rather than counterfactuals.50 Thus, 
we can reformulate Tweedt’s Reformulated CORNEA as follows (where 
“P(E|H & B)” means the epistemic probability of evidence E given 
hypothesis H and background evidence B):
Re-reformulated CORNEA – E (incrementally) supports H only if P(E|H & B) >  
P(E|~H & B)
Applied to appearances of gratuitous evil, the basic idea is that the prop-
osition 〈it seems that there are gratuitous evils〉 will confirm that there are 
gratuitous evils only if the existence of these appearances is more likely 
given the existence of gratuitous evils than their non-existence. Even more 
simply, say there weren’t gratuitous evils. Would you still be just as likely 
to have appearances of gratuitous evil? If so, then those appearances don’t 
rationally support the existence of gratuitous evil.
Let us assume that Reformulated CORNEA is true. Even granting this 
principle, it is not at all obvious that gratuitous evil appearances don’t 
support the existence of gratuitous evils. The key is whether P(E|H & 
B) > P(E|~H & B), where E = 〈it seems that there are gratuitous evils〉 
and H = 〈there are gratuitous evils〉. The skeptical theist will try to argue 
that, “We’re so severely cognitively limited and in the dark about God’s 
reasons for allowing evil, the relations between various goods and evils, 
and so on that even if there weren’t any gratuitous evil, we would be 
just as likely to have the same experiences of poignant evil.”51 But this 
line of thought is highly contestable. Given ordinary human background 
evidence, wouldn’t it be more likely to appear that there are gratuitous 
evils if those kinds of evils really existed? After all, if gratuitous evils are 
out there, then it’s not unlikely that one runs into them and recognizes 
them as such, especially if they are ubiquitous as they are likely to be 
on naturalism. So, appearances of gratuitous evil should be expected to 
happen with some regularity. But if there aren’t any gratuitous evils, one 
wouldn’t necessarily expect to have regular appearances of gratuitous 
evil. At least, one might reasonably expect such appearances to be less 
frequent than in a world with actual gratuitous evil. To bolster the point, 
consider: if every single evil had a greater purpose to it, then shouldn’t 
we expect to discover justifying reasons more often than in a world full of 
49Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401.
50Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401–402.
51Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 403.
436 Faith and Philosophy
gratuitous evils?52 In which case we should expect gratuitous evil appear-
ances to be less common were there no gratuitous evils. Skeptical theists 
might manufacture counters to this line of reasoning; nevertheless, this 
seems a plausible representation of the conditional probabilities given 
a fairly common set of background evidence.53 If so, then P(E|H & B) > 
P(E|~H & B) for those with that sort of background evidence. These 
people will continue to receive rational support from gratuitous evil 
appearances.
Let us now turn to appearances of intrinsic wrongness—when it seems 
to the subject that it is intrinsically wrong for God to allow some instance, 
kind, or pattern of evil to occur. In accordance with PC, such appear-
ances provide rational support for the existence of impermissible evils. 
Even apart from PC, the general rule is that its appearing that p provides 
some reason to believe that p. Part of what makes appearances of intrinsic 
wrongness different, and more formidable, than gratuitous evil appear-
ances is that there is no surveying of greater goods or worse evils for 
skeptical theists to challenge. Instead, the inherent impermissibility of an 
action (or inaction, rather) is intuited, presumably by whatever faculties 
standardly produce moral intuitions, and our general ability to intuit such 
moral principles should not be denied. In fact, skeptical theists have spe-
cial reason to affirm this ability as it is helpful in warding off moral skep-
ticism. For instance, part of Bergmann’s response to charges that skeptical 
theism leads to moral skepticism is to argue:
Some actions are intrinsically morally wrong, regardless of their conse-
quences. If some action appears to be intrinsically morally wrong, regardless 
of its consequences, there’s no reason to think that a skeptical theist can’t, on 
that basis, reasonably believe that it is morally wrong.54
In the same way, then, appearances of intrinsic wrongness may lead one 
to reasonably believe that certain evils are intrinsically wrong for God 
to allow.
How might the skeptical theist respond? Bergmann’s response is to 
argue, for any of the evils we have observed, that appearances of intrinsic 
wrongness do not rationally support their content. He does not wish to 
undermine our moral intuitions generally, but only to challenge whether 
52Evils can appear to have a point when they actually do not (see, e.g., Nietzsche’s Human, 
All Too Human, §108). My point is just that, plausibly, it is overall more likely to appear as 
though there is a purpose to evil if there really is one.
53We must keep in mind that we are looking at what one should reasonably expect given 
the evidence available to him or her. Thus, the mere fact that it is possible for evils to seem gra-
tuitous when they are not on a large scale does not counter the claim that one should expect 
gratuitous evil appearances to be less frequent when there aren’t any genuinely gratuitous 
evils. Even if that possibility were, in fact, one’s actual situation, it wouldn’t change what is 
reasonable for one to expect unless one gains evidence to that effect.
54Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 26.
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in this case we are really in a position to see that allowing such evils is 
intrinsically wrong. He begins by proposing the following:
P1 – For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, 
there are possible states of affairs that are significantly worse than it or pos-
sible states of affairs that are outweighing greater goods.
If we grant P1, then we should also be able to imagine a scenario in which 
the suffering we know of is necessary to prevent some significantly worse 
state of affairs or to attain some outweighing greater good—a scenario 
that, given ST3, for all we know is true. Thus, P1 naturally leads to P2:
P2 – For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, 
although it is an intrinsically bad state of affairs, it is not intrinsically wrong 
to permit it, regardless of the consequences.
Such considerations, if correct, would show that appearances of intrinsic 
wrongness are in this context misguided.55 If it is wrong for God to permit 
an evil, it is because there is no morally justifying reason, and the skeptical 
theist’s skepticism about our grasp of potential morally justifying reasons 
comes back into play.
Bergmann’s reasoning is plausible, but not incontestable. Let us first 
draw a distinction between scenarios in which suffering is permitted to 
prevent a worse state of affairs and those in which suffering is permitted 
to attain some greater good. We can go ahead and grant that if God was 
faced with the decision between allowing something bad and allowing 
something far worse, then it would not be intrinsically wrong for him to 
allow the lesser evil; however, the application of this principle to God’s 
allowance of suffering is suspect. For most in the Christian tradition, at 
least, God needn’t have created anything at all. Thus, God is never in the 
situation of choosing between allowing the Holocaust and allowing some-
thing even worse, for he always has the morally permissible option of 
just not creating. So while it is possible to imagine states of affairs much 
worse than any of the sufferings we have observed, it may still be the case 
that the allowance of those sufferings is wrong in any possible circum-
stance (because allowing worse states of affairs is, for God, never abso-
lutely necessary for eliminating suffering).56 If intrinsic wrongness is to 
be ruled out, it must be on the basis of outweighing greater goods. The 
55Put aside whether such considerations are supposed to defeat the initial support pro-
vided by appearances of intrinsic wrongness or to prevent them from providing any rational 
in the first place. The upshot is largely the same, the main difference being the same one 
observed with gratuitous evil appearances: allowing for initial support leaves open the pos-
sibility of merely partial defeat.
56Allowing suffering might still be necessary for eliminating some worse evil in a condi-
tional sense. For instance, it might be the case that one cannot eliminate suffering X without 
allowing some worse state of affairs Y and forsaking some greater good Z. That is, if we want Z, 
then we cannot eliminate X without bringing about Y. But this just goes to my larger point 
that we will eventually need to appeal to an outweighing good to justify the allowance of 
suffering.
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problem is that one can maintain, with some plausibility, that some of the 
horrors we have witnessed are so terrible that the idea of an outweighing 
good simply doesn’t come into consideration at all—there are some trans-
actions you never make no matter what the potential return. This is, as 
Dougherty points out,57 one of the intuitions elicited so poignantly by Ivan 
in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov:
Tell me straight out, I call on you—answer me: imagine that you yourself 
are building the edifice of human destiny with the object of making people 
happy in the finale, of giving them peace and rest at last, but for that you 
must inevitably and unavoidably torture just one tiny creature, that same 
child who was beating her chest with her little fist, and raise your edifice on 
the foundation of her unrequited tears—would you agree to be the architect 
on such conditions? Tell me the truth.58
The intuition is echoed in Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away 
From Omelas” and seems to be shared by many. It insists that no matter 
how great a good might result, it is intrinsically wrong to achieve that 
result, to “raise your edifice,” on the tears of an innocent child. Thus, while 
greater goods may result from suffering, they cannot be said to outweigh 
that suffering as P1 asserts, and so the basis for P2 is removed.
To be clear, I am not endorsing this objection to Bergmann’s reasoning 
(in fact, I reject it). My point is that there are sure to be individuals who can 
reasonably reject P1 and P2 in the way I have outlined. And such people 
will, I submit, receive rational support for the existence of impermissible 
evils when it seems to them that allowing some instance or kind of suffer-
ing is intrinsically wrong. Skeptical theism alone cannot prevent it.
2.2. How Well Does God’s Existence Fit with Evil?
Let us put aside impermissibility appearances and focus on the evidence 
of evil more broadly. Whether the evidence of evil provides rational sup-
port against theism depends on how well that evidence fits with theism 
and how this compares to the fit between that evidence and atheism.59 The 
fit between theism and the evidence of evil, however, can be influenced by 
57Dougherty, “The Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
58Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 245. It is actually unclear whether Ivan himself 
has the intuition that God’s allowance of suffering is intrinsically wrong. There is a case 
to be made that it does not seem to him that the suffering of children is unjustified (he 
apparently concedes that it is); nonetheless, he emotionally construes God’s allowance of 
suffering to be heinous. It may be this emotional barrier that motivates his rebellion rather 
than the belief that God’s allowance is intrinsically wrong. See Colgrove, “The Emotional 
Impact of Evil.”
59This notion of “fit” is intended to be neutral between theories of epistemic support. For 
instance, if one is a Bayesian, then one is welcome to understand “theism’s fit with observed 
evils” to be referring to the conditional probability of theism given our observations of evil. 
Or if one is an explanationist, then one is welcome to understand “theism’s fit with observed 
evils” to be referring to how good of an explanation theism provides for our observations 
of evil.
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one’s perspective. Specifically, the shift towards an atheistic perspective 
can diminish the fit between theism and the evidence of evil for a subject, 
thereby increasing the rational support that that evidence provides for 
atheism. Here the perspective does not change the evidence but rather the 
significance of the evidence.
There are at least two ways in which this might occur. First, the fit 
between theism and observed evils can differ from subject to subject 
depending on their background evidence. As Paul Draper says, “the plau-
sibility of an interpretation is relative to the beliefs of the interpreter.”60 
Remember Stump’s story of Max and the hospital. The conclusions one 
should draw about evil and suffering depend to a great extent on which 
interpretive framework is operating in the background.
To give a more familiar example, whether the evidence of evil fits well 
with the existence of a loving God depends dramatically on what love is. 
If love pursues the wellbeing of the beloved, and one holds a desire-sat-
isfaction theory of wellbeing, then a loving God would seek to maximize 
the desire-fulfillment of his creatures as far as he could. Our desires are 
better satisfied in a heavenly paradise, so there is little reason to create 
even a temporary epoch of human suffering. On this sort of worldview, 
the evidence of evil might constitute serious evidence against the exist-
ence of a loving God. On the other hand, if your background evidence 
provides for a morally richer world—one in which human wellbeing is 
objective, requiring one to freely forsake worldly desires, adorn oneself 
with virtue, and be transformed into the likeness of a sacrificial God—
then a temporary epoch of human suffering in which we are given oppor-
tunities to prepare for eternity makes more sense. On this worldview, the 
evidence of evil may be no evidence against God at all. The upshot is that 
evil might provide rational support for atheism given one set of back-
ground evidence but not another. Thus, shifting the background evidence 
via a broader change in perspective can move one into a position where 
the evidence of evil supports atheism in a way it didn’t before.
Note that this kind of reinterpretation of the evidence is perfectly com-
patible with the position that epistemic support relations are objective 
and necessary. It is likewise compatible with Feldman’s uniqueness the-
sis, which maintains that a body of evidence can rationally support “at 
most one attitude towards any particular proposition.”61 It may well be 
that there is only one reasonable way to weigh the significance of evils vis-
à-vis theism given a particular body of evidence. The current point is just 
that a shift in perspective can embed the evidence of evil within a larger 
evidential context that proves more hostile to theism.62
60Draper, “Comments,” 198.
61Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 148.
62Even objective Bayesians, for instance, are happy to acknowledge that 
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That being said, it is increasingly common to maintain that multiple 
doxastic attitudes can fit the same total body of evidence—a position 
known as epistemic permissivism.63 On permissivism, the non-eviden-
tial attitudes of the subject have some influence on what her total body 
of evidence rationally supports, and plausibly, a shift in perspective can 
alter those non-evidential attitudes in a way that threatens theism. Tweedt 
shows how this might play out in our assessments of evil given different 
forms of permissivism.64 Thus, permissivism, if true, allows changes in 
perspective to result in additional support for atheism by altering how the 
subject weighs her evidence.
While permissivism may be compatible with the position that epis-
temic support relations are objective, permissivism goes especially well 
with a more subjective view. Richard Foley’s theory of inferential sup-
port provides a representative example. According to Foley, evidence E 
makes it epistemically rational for subject S to form some doxastic attitude 
X towards a hypothesis H if and only if X satisfies S’s deepest epistemic 
standards in the pursuit of truth—that is, if and only if S would form atti-
tude X towards H on the basis of E after engaging in fully conscientious 
reflection.65 There is no guarantee, of course, that two subjects will have 
the same deep epistemic standards or reach the same conclusions upon 
meeting those standards. It will depend, among other things, on how 
things seem to each subject. This is especially true with respect to intri-
cate issues like God and evil. On such views, the evidence of evil might 
provide rational support against theism for one subject but not another 
depending on one’s perspective.
As an attempt to block support for atheism, the skeptical theist may 
argue that the fit between theism and the evidence of evil is inscrutable 
given the complexity of the issues and our rather poor epistemic posi-
tion with respect to them. This skeptical theist maneuver may not work 
if support relations are subjective in the way that Foley maintains. If after 
conscientious reflection, including reflection in light of skeptical theist 
considerations, the subject would still increase her confidence in atheism, 
then that is what is rational for the subject to do. Skeptical theism has 
no way to appeal this verdict. If support relations are objective, then the 
skeptical maneuver faces other challenges. One is that the evidence of evil 
might still provide objective support against God’s existence even if we 
63Permissivism thus denies Feldman’s uniqueness thesis. On permissivism, see Jackson 
and Turnbull, “Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence,” and Schoenfield, 
“Permission to Believe.”
64Tweedt, “Taking a New Perspective on Suffering.” Tweedt uses the word “perspective” 
in a different sense than I do. However, as far as I can tell, one’s perspective in my sense will 
directly affect one’s perspective in Tweedt’s sense. This is because what the subject makes of the 
evidence (a notion at the core of Tweedt’s conception of a perspective) will be heavily affected 
by how things seem to that subject—e.g., how well the evidence seems to fit with God’s exist-
ence; how salient certain items of data seem to be; whether the absence of suffering seems 
like a reward or one’s due; etc.
65Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality and Working without a Net.
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grant the claims of inscrutability. For if support relations are truly objec-
tive (the standard view is that they are necessary, logical relations) then 
their existence doesn’t depend on our ability to discern them. Thus, the 
evidence of evil could be evidence against God even if we can’t appreci-
ate it as such. The skeptical theist may insist that evil only provides sup-
port against God if the subject can appreciate the poor objective fit between 
the evidence of evil and God’s existence. Even if this point is conceded 
(and it would not be by all), there is still the problem that skeptical theism 
itself can be more or less plausible. As one’s confidence in ST goes down, 
one’s confidence in assessing the fit between evil and theism goes up. So, 
once again, there is room for some individuals to receive support for athe-
ism, even if that level of support is diminished by the skeptical theist’s 
considerations.
We thus have another way for an atheistic perspective to increase sup-
port for atheism. By either changing one’s larger body of evidence, or else 
changing how one weighs that evidence, the shift towards an atheistic 
perspective can lead one to reinterpret the evidence of evil in a way less 
favorable to theism.
2.3.The Background Plausibility of Theism
The third way in which the shift towards an atheistic perspective can 
increase rational support for atheism is by moving the subject towards a 
broader atheistic worldview on which God’s existence becomes increas-
ingly implausible to begin with. To illustrate the point, consider how 
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The prior or initial probability of the hypothesis—its probability given the 
background evidence—must be taken into account when calculating the 
probability of that hypothesis in light of new evidence. Neglecting to do so 
is to commit the base rate fallacy. Nothing here is specific to Bayesianism 
either. The basic idea is plausible to all: If you know that q increases or 
diminishes the plausibility of p, you cannot tell how plausible p ends up 
being unless you know how plausible it was to begin with. This is, for 
instance, why explanationists count fit with the background evidence, or 
initial plausibility, as an explanatory virtue.
The shift towards an atheistic perspective can lower the initial plausi-
bility of God’s existence by altering the subject’s background evidence. 
For illustration, let us introduce a subject named “Ivan” who, after being 
haunted by the suffering of innocent children, transitions to the perva-
sive atheistic perspective described in Section I.  Ivan’s intuitions now 
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systematically align with naturalism. It seems that there aren’t any gods, 
that naturalism is far simpler than theism, that observed phenomena can 
all be explained naturalistically, and so on. Not only would Ivan’s assess-
ment of the intrinsic plausibility of naturalism go up (due to its seeming 
simpler than once thought), but certain arguments for theism are also no 
longer convincing while confirmation of naturalism is more forthcoming. 
All this settles into Ivan’s background evidence such that, when Ivan gets 
around to reflecting on the significance of the observed evils, the starting 
plausibility of theism is much lower than it otherwise would have been.
This is a form of what Gellman calls “mediated support for atheism” 
which, though caused by experiences of evil, is working in the back-
ground so to speak, apart from any theorizing about evil specifically.66 
Accordingly, this is a form of rational support that skeptical theism cannot 
undercut, at least not directly.
2.4. A Potential Defeater
I have explicated three ways in which the transition to an atheistic per-
spective can generate support for atheism. It is worth asking, as the reflec-
tive atheist will surely do, whether this shift in perspective can be trusted. 
The fact that this shift in perspective stems from encounters with evil 
exposes it to a number of worries. The atheist might ask himself or herself: 
Is this perspective shift driven by emotional trauma rather than insight? 
Am I simply angry with God for letting my loved ones suffer? If so, this 
might give the atheist an undermining defeater for the rational support 
arising from his or her change in perspective.
This challenge is not as decisive as the theist might hope. The first thing 
to note is that, given internalism, these challenges can diminish the rational 
support stemming from one’s newfound perspective only if the subject 
has evidence of them. A  second caveat is that the subject’s support for 
atheism is diminished only to a degree proportional to one’s evidence for 
the objection. It’s not an all-or-nothing matter. To fully do away with the 
rational support provided by this shift in perspective, the subject would 
need to have strong evidence that it could not be trusted. Such evidence is 
a difficult thing to provide. For some subjects, of course, it might be obvi-
ous that their newfound atheistic perspectives cannot be trusted. Perhaps 
it is plain that the perspective stems from a kind of emotional rebellion. 
But this is certainly not the case for all subjects who undergo such shifts in 
perspective. To the contrary, it seems to some that they have been awak-
ened to the true state of things.67 The misleading lens of wishful thinking 
has been cast aside to reveal the bleakness of reality undistorted—or so it 
seems to them. If further reflection only confirms this understanding of 
their atheistic perspective, then they seem justified in continuing to trust 
that perspective other things being equal. In still many more cases, the 
66Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism.”
67Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 109–111.
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origins of the perspective are unclear. This would give the subject reason 
to be somewhat suspicious of his or her new perspective, but it would not 
push him or her to dismiss it altogether.
It should also be noted that the relevant sort of perspective shift—one 
on which evil comes to constitute serious evidence against God—is not 
always triggered by encounters with evil. Consider a student who begins 
questioning his childhood theistic beliefs after entering college and stud-
ying alternative worldviews. After reading several naturalistic philoso-
phers, the naturalistic worldview begins to seem increasingly intuitive 
until, one day, he finds himself with a strong atheistic perspective. The 
student may have very little reason to suspect that this perspective shift 
was the result of anything other than rational reflection.
To summarize our discussion thus far, I argued that encountering evil 
can shift one towards an atheistic perspective, and that doing so can pro-
vide additional support for atheism by intensifying the common sense 
problem of evil, by changing one’s interpretation of the evidence of evil 
(making it fit less well with theism), and by diminishing support for 
theism within one’s larger worldview. The ability of perspective shifts to 
generate support for atheism in these ways is the perspectival problem 
of evil.
3. The Limitations of Skeptical Theism
What if you are a theist concerned to counter the perspectival problem of 
evil in others? As the previous discussion makes apparent, it is going to 
be very hard to prevent the subject from having adequate reason to aban-
don theism if one’s atheistic perspective remains in place. Any strategy 
that leaves the subject’s perspective untouched and merely tries to defeat 
the justification provided by that perspective is a symptomatic treatment. 
It may temporarily diminish the subject’s rational support for atheism 
(some of it), but it won’t address the source of the problem, allowing the 
atheistic perspective to solidify its grip on the mind. What is needed is a 
response that can combat the perspective shift itself—one that can halt the 
transition to an atheistic perspective or even move one towards a theistic 
perspective.
The fact of the matter is that skeptical theism just isn’t very good at 
this. It was never meant to be. This is not a flaw with skeptical theism 
so much as an inherent limitation. By highlighting our ignorance, it tries 
to prevent one’s newfound perspective from providing evidence against 
God’s existence; but acknowledging our ignorance does little to alter the 
perspective itself. Skeptical theism may have some neutralizing effect on 
one’s perspective, for instance, by pointing to the fact that different per-
spectives can lead to such different and such radically misguided evalua-
tions of evil (think of Max).68 But, of course, this same point could be made 
68This was helpfully pointed out by a reviewer and in conversation with J. Caleb Clanton.
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with respect to a great many substantive issues on which there is disa-
greement—disputants hold different perspectives, at least one of which 
is seriously mistaken—yet that generally will not (and should not) stop 
them from seeing and judging things as they do.
This is not to say that skeptical theism is false, or that it should not be 
a part of the theist’s overall response. It may undermine more traditional 
attempts to disprove God on the basis of evil. It may even be partially 
successful in addressing the perspectival problem of evil by reducing 
the level of rational support provided against God’s existence. I consider 
myself a skeptical theist, for what it’s worth. What I am saying is that it 
cannot constitute the entirety of the theist’s response to the problem of evil, 
not if one wishes to prevent evil from rationally leading people away from 
belief in God.
What would a more complete response look like? One that has the 
potential to prevent or reverse the underlying perspective shift. I  hope 
to detail which kinds of responses are effective in this regard (and why) 
in another forum, but the key is this: A more complete response should 
(i) invite the subject to enter into a theistic perspective when considering 
evil, allowing a theodicy or defense to be presented in the most charitable 
light,69 or (ii) foster personal knowledge of God to serve as grounds for 
faith in his goodness.70
4. The Problem of Evil Reconsidered
Attention to the perspectival problem of evil has other important impli-
cations for how we conceive of the problem of evil more generally, two of 
which I will draw attention to here.
First, consider how we typically frame debates about evil: Do observed 
patterns of pain and suffering provide evidence against the existence of a loving 
God? This is the wrong question, or at least a misleading one. It conveys 
that there is a non-person-relative answer—that a simple “yes” or “no” is 
possible. Instead, we must ask whether the evidence of evil provides evi-
dence against the existence of a loving God for an individual, given his or 
her particular worldview and perspective. Evil might disconfirm God for 
some but not others. Further dialogue must then continue from a broader 
purview. We must reorient our focus on which perspectives, and corre-
sponding worldviews, are more likely to be true than others, assessing 
them for simplicity and elegance, internal coherence, fit with our other 
69This is what I believe Stump is trying to achieve through her analysis of Biblical nar-
ratives in Wandering in Darkness. See her detailed account of how narratives communicate 
knowledge involving mirror neurons, second-person experiences, and non-propositional 
knowledge of persons (Ch. 3–4). For a more intuitive explanation of entering into a perspec-
tive, see the notion of “looking along” the beam (as opposed to merely “looking at” it) in 
Lewis, “Meditation in a Toolshed.”
70For an account of faith and how it might affect one’s perspective towards God, see 
McAllister, “The Perspective of Faith” and “The Partiality of Faith.”
71Graham Oppy, “Problems of Evil,” is already moving the conversation in this direction.
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evidence, and other explanatory virtues.71 Of course, the reader will not be 
surprised to discover that one’s assessment of these various worldviews 
will be inextricably pervaded by one’s own perspective. There is no view 
from nowhere. The point is that our efforts at discovering the significance 
of the evidence of evil must proceed on a more global level.
Second, contemporary work on the problem of evil has paid relatively 
little attention to the traumatic effects of evil,72 preferring to focus exclu-
sively on whether observed patterns of evil and suffering are inconsist-
ent with, or provide evidence against, the existence of God. The reason 
that the psychological effects of evil are set aside is because they are 
seen as matters of pastoral rather than philosophical concern.73 This 
familiar distinction between the pastoral and the philosophical prob-
lems of evil is a helpful one. Nevertheless, the perspectival problem of 
evil shows that the pastoral and the philosophical are more interrelated 
than commonly recognized. For it is precisely the sort of existential cri-
sis falling under the scope of the pastoral problem that is liable to instill 
an atheistic perspective in the individual, placing him or her in a posi-
tion in which the philosophical problem becomes especially trenchant. 
Thus, philosophers may have difficulty gaining traction with respect to 
the philosophical problem of evil until the pastoral problem has been 
addressed, and not necessarily because those listening are irrational, but 
because those people experience the world in such a way that prevents 
them from appreciating the cogency of the considerations presented.74 
If a perspective shift is needed, however, then skeptical theism alone is 
poorly suited to the task.75
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